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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the question of how much the Internet lowers prices for new cars and why.
Using a large dataset of transaction prices for new automobiles and referral data from Autobytel.com, we
find that online consumers pay on average 1.2% less than do offline consumers. After controlling for
selection, we find that using Autobytel.com reduces the price a consumer pays by approximately 2.2%.
This suggests that consumers who use an Internet referral service are not those who would have obtained
a low price even in the absence of the Internet. Instead, our finding is consistent with consumers choosing
to use Autobytel.com because they know that they would do poorly in the traditional channel, perhaps
because they have a high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining. This group
disproportionately uses Autobytel.com because its members are the ones with the most to gain. We
estimate that  savings to consumers who use Autobytel.com alone are at least $240 million per year. Since
there are other referral and informational sites that may also help consumers bargain more effectively with
dealers, we conclude that the Internet is facilitating a large transfer of surplus to Internet consumers in the
retail auto industry.
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From the time the Internet started to be used for commercial applications, much attention has
centered on predictions that, while the Internet would introduce new business opportunities
for some ﬁrms, it would substantially lower the proﬁtability of many ﬁrms. These predictions
were based on economic and marketing theories which show that the more easily customers
can obtain information about prices and products, the lower seller’s proﬁtability will be, either
through market forces of competition or because customers will have better negotiating posi-
tions. The most prevalent method of studying these predictions has been to compare market
outcomes in online and oﬄine markets.
An area that has received much less attention is how the Internet aﬀects oﬄine transactions
in established industries. Transactions need not occur online in order to be aﬀected by the fact
that the Internet makes price and product information more easily available, and that new
Internet institutions change the way that price negotiation is conducted.
An excellent illustration of this is the auto industry, one of the largest and most important
industries in the US. By regulation, retail sales of new automobiles must be made by local deal-
ers, not by manufacturers or third parties. Most automobile dealers sell cars by negotiating
prices individually with each customer. As a result, identical cars can sell for prices that diﬀer
by hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars. Dealership proﬁts would therefore be dramatically
reduced if all customers paid the lowest price a dealer is willing to agree to. The Internet has
made possible easily accessible third party “infomediaries,” which purport to enable customers
to obtain just such prices. Not surprisingly, given the magnitude of consumers’ average ex-
penditure and the confrontational nature of the purchase process, infomediaries have become
popular in the automotive industry. In 2000, according to J.D. Power and Associates (2000b),
48% of new car buyers visited at least one independent vehicle site such as Autobytel.com,
Carpoint.com, Edmunds.com, ConsumerReports.com, and KelleyBlueBook.com.
The question this paper addresses is whether such infomediaries can lower prices – and
perhaps proﬁts – in an established oﬄine industry. In particular, we examine evidence that
Internet referral services causally lower prices for retail auto sales. This paper begins where
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) left oﬀ. In that paper we showed that
consumers in California who used such a service paid on average 1.5% less, controlling for the
car purchased, than traditional consumers. However, that ﬁnding appears at ﬁrst blush to say
more about whether the Internet lowers car retailers’ proﬁtability than it really does. This is
because, holding cost constant, proﬁts in the car industry will have been changed by the Internet
only if the Internet has changed the distribution of prices. Just because Internet consumers are
paying less than oﬄine consumers does not mean that they are paying less than they would if
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“cowboys” of our title, would generate unequal prices in the two channels, and lower prices in
the Internet channel, without changing the price any given individual pays. Instead, if Internet
referral services are used disproportionally by those who are averse to comparison shopping and
haggling, the “cowards” of our title, then the Internet is aiding these consumers in obtaining
lower prices than they would receive oﬄine. In this latter case, the Internet has a real eﬀect
on the distribution of prices, and hence the division of surplus in car retailing.
To obtain an estimate of the causal eﬀect of Internet referral services on car prices, we
control for potential selection eﬀects with instrumental variables. In addition to estimating
the ‘treatment’ eﬀect of Internet referral services on the prices paid by online consumers, this
approach also allow us determine which types of consumers are disproportionally likely to use
the Internet for car buying. We supplement this statistical approach with a consumer survey
in which we ask consumers directly about the unobserved variables which we believe may lead
to selection eﬀects. This allows us to test directly for a correlation between these variables and
reported Internet use.
We answer these research questions by analyzing transaction data on over 600,000 new car
purchases nationwide in combination with referral data from Autobytel.com. Autobytel.com
is an independent Internet referral service that oﬀers consumers detailed information about
individual cars, including current market conditions and invoice pricing. Autobytel.com also has
contractual relationships with approximately 5,000 of the 22,000 US dealerships (in Q1, 2001)
which are designed to help Autobytel.com users get good prices for their cars. From the website,
a consumer may submit a free purchase request that is forwarded to one of Autobytel.com’s
contracting dealers. The dealer then responds with a price oﬀer which is supposed to be the
lowest price the dealer would generally oﬀer in the showroom.
We ﬁnd that consumers who use Autobytel.com pay on average 0.9% less than traditional
buyers for an identical car. However, after instrumenting for Autobytel.com usage, our estimate
of the causal eﬀect of the Internet on price, compared to the traditional channel is approximately
2.4%. (Purchasing from an Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealer, regardless of what channel was used
to buy the car, results in price that is lower by about 1%.) The increase in the magnitude of
the Autobytel.com coeﬃcient between the two speciﬁcations suggests that consumers who use
an Internet referral service are those who are poor at bargaining in the traditional channel.
This may be due to a lack of bargaining skill, or an aversion to (or high cost of) engaging in
protracted face-to-face negotiation.
While these results suggests that consumers who consider themselves disadvantaged in the
traditional face-to-face bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet, we cannot test
this conclusion directly with our large dataset of transactions because the data lacks measures
3of consumers’ cost of bargaining or searching. Therefore we have collected a second set of data
which contains measures of whether individuals perceive themselves to be poor bargainers and
whether they are time constrained in negotiating for a new car. We ﬁnd that consumers who
expressed a high disutility of bargaining and lack of time were more likely to use the Internet.
It seems that these consumers are suﬃciently aware of their bargaining disadvantage that they
choose to use the Internet as a way to improve their bargaining outcome. These results conﬁrm
our conjecture from our instrumental variables estimation, namely that it is the “cowards,” not
the “cowboys” who are disproportionately likely to use the Internet.
We conclude from the combination of our results that the Internet, by aiding some con-
sumers in obtaining lower prices than they would have received oﬄine, has had – at the time
of our study – a real eﬀect on the division of surplus in car retailing. We hesitate to draw
conclusions about the long run equilibrium in this industry, since our data are for 1999, a
relatively early year for Internet referral services. Our analysis focuses on the early adopters of
this technology, and assumes that this small group has not yet caused changes in the remainder
of the industry – such as new oﬄine equilibrium prices and dealer exits.
We also ﬁnd that consumers who purchase at the Autobytel.com dealer to whom they were
referred pay, on average, nearly the same as consumers who switch to another dealer ($32 less for
switchers). While this suggests that the information provided by Autobytel.com is portable, it
also suggests that consumers, on average, beneﬁt only a very small amount from switching away
from the referral dealer. Further, we compare the prices paid by online consumers who obtained
a referral for the speciﬁc make and model that they purchased with the prices paid by online
consumers who requested a referral for a car diﬀerent from the one they ultimately bought.
The group that obtained information on the product purchased paid about 1% less than oﬄine
consumers; the group that obtained information on a diﬀerent product from the one purchased
paid 0.5% less than oﬄine consumers. This suggests that having a make- and model-speciﬁc
price quote has a bigger eﬀect on the price a customer pays than does general information
that might be obtained using the Internet. It also suggests that information drives prices, not
individual characteristics associated with Internet usage. This ﬁnding is also consistent with
our previous result, namely that the mere fact that a consumer has chosen to use the Internet
in searching for a new car cannot explain the lower prices Autobytel.com consumers obtain.
This paper contributes to a small body of empirical literature analyzing the eﬀect of Internet
institutions such as referral services and shopping agents on ﬁrms’ product market behavior.
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Ellison and Ellison (2004), and Iyer and Pazgal (2003) analyze
the eﬀect of comparison shopping agents on ﬁrms’ pricing strategies. Brown and Goolsbee
(2002) shows that the Internet may have helped to lower prices for term life insurance. In a
recent theoretical paper, Chen, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002) analyze “referral infomediaries”
4and argue that referral services help retailers price discriminate and that referral infomediaries
should contract only with a subset of retailers. Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso
(2001) is the precursor to this paper – we begin where that paper ends. That paper documents
diﬀerences in online vs. oﬄine pricing of new cars, however, it does not address selection, rent
redistribution, or the eﬀects of competition. In particular, Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and
Silva-Risso (2001) does not estimate the ‘treatment eﬀect’ of referral infomediaries nor does it
answer which types of consumers are most likely to use the Internet. Finally, that paper only
had data from California, whereas the present paper relies on a national sample.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we discuss why an Internet referral service may change
vehicle prices. In section 3, we discuss our national transaction dataset. Section 4 is a compar-
ison of online and oﬄine prices for cars. We also examine how the price paid by Autobytel.com
users varies with level of competition in the retail auto market. In section 5, we control for se-
lection and derive the average savings that result from using Autobytel.com. We also estimate
consumers’ probability of using the Internet with a second set of data which includes measures
of consumer traits. Section 6 is an analysis of which aspect of a referral enables consumers to
obtain a lower price. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The eﬀect of Internet referral services on prices
A consumer who submits a purchase request on an Internet referral service provides her name,
address, contact information, and the type of car she is looking for. The dealership contacts
the consumer within 48 hours (often much sooner) with a “ﬁxed” price.1 In this way, a con-
sumer may purchase a car without setting foot in the dealership until she picks up the vehicle.
Autobytel.com assigns dealers an exclusive territory; any leads generated within that territory
are passed on to the dealer in exchange for a dealer subscription fee. Dealers pay an annual
ﬁxed fee based on the size of the dealership, on average $1607/month. Since the closing ratio
(sales/referrals) is about 13% for Autobytel.com, dealers pay on average $135 per sold vehicle to
Autobytel.com.2. In this section, we discuss several reasons for which Internet referral service
users might pay prices diﬀerent from those paid by traditional consumers.
1According to J.D. Power and Associates (2000a), 42% of dealerships claim that their initial price contains
no room for further negotiation. 42% give discounts but leave room for negotiation. 14% will quote a discounted
price only if the customer insists by e-mail or phone. 2% of dealerships don’t give discounted price until the
consumer comes to the dealership.
2Youngme Moon (1999), “Autobytel.com,” HBS Case Study, and J.D. Power and Associates (2000a)
52.1 Possible reasons for oﬄine vs. online price diﬀerences
There are several diﬀerent, not necessarily mutually exclusive, reasons that online prices may
be lower than oﬄine prices.
Online consumers are better informed: The higher quality and lower price of online information
may lead consumers to consume more information than they would have oﬄine. Consumers
who are better informed about market prices, the characteristics of their preferred cars, and
negotiation strategies may be better armed to bargain with the dealer and thus receive, on
average, a lower price. Better information is likely to be particularly important because prices
for cars are individually negotiated, instead of being posted.
Bargaining on behalf of consumers: The contract between the Internet referral service and
the dealer contains incentives that may cause the dealer to oﬀer referred customers low prices.
While an Autobytel.com dealer may decide whether and how to convert each lead into a sale,
the service expects a substantial proportion of leads to result in a sale.3 If the percentage of
referrals “closed” (sales/referrals) is too low, the dealer may be terminated by the Internet
referral service and replaced by another dealer in that area. Provided the stream of customers
generated by the Internet referral service is valuable to the dealership, it has an incentive
to quote prices low enough to keep its “close” percentage suﬃciently high. In a sense, the
referral service bargains on behalf of a group of consumers, although that group is not yet
formed. Autobytel’s bargaining is eﬀective partially because the consumers in the group are
incremental to the dealership.4
Salesperson compensation: Autobytel.com stipulates in its contracts that the “Internet sales-
person” at a dealership should handle only Internet referrals and not “walk-ins.” Also, this
salesperson is supposed to be compensated on sales volume rather than on margin. This encour-
ages the Internet salesperson to focus on closing additional sales rather than on maximizing
unit proﬁts.5 However, both dealers and managers at Autobytel.com reported inconsistent
compliance among dealers with Autobytel.com’s rules.
Lower selling cost: It is possible that an Internet sale is less costly to carry out than a con-
ventional sale. Online buyers may be low cost because they have searched already (perhaps
3Autobytel.com monitors this with customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys are the only way the referral
service knows if its customers are receiving the service they expected.
4Autobytel.com dealers have told us that they consider the subscription fee to be a kind of dealer advertising;
the cost of attracting one customer using Autobytel.com is less than that of using traditional advertising.
5We would expect this practice itself - regardless of the Internet - to lead to lower prices. However, it would
presumably be much more eﬀective for a given dealership to implement it in conjunction with an increase in
consumer traﬃc. In this way, the salesperson’s total compensation and hours worked remain high. The low
price/high volume strategy can be more eﬀectively undertaken through business stealing via the Internet in
conjunction with a change in sales staﬀ compensation.
6test-driving at another dealership), have decided what car they want, and are ready to buy.
Therefore, the dealer may be able to spend less time selling and haggling. Because Internet
sales typically are performed by an “Internet Sales Department” with proﬁt and loss respon-
sibility separate from conventional sales, we would expect that lower costs in that department
might translate into lower equilibrium prices for cars sold to Internet customers.
Lower cost dealerships: In addition, consumers may gain from shopping online even if Internet
referral services do not cause dealers to oﬀer diﬀerent prices to online and oﬄine consumers.
This is because referral services may simply sign up the lowest-cost/lowest-price dealers in each
region. In this way a consumer gains by using the service because she does not have to search
for the cheapest dealership in her area.
There is also an argument for why consumers who use referral services may pay more than
other consumers.
Online consumers are less price sensitive: Internet referral services are convenient because
they allow a consumer to engage in the car purchase process at any time of day or night
without leaving her home. In addition, referral services reduce consumers’ direct interaction
with dealers. To the extent that consumers with a high utility for convenience are less price
sensitive, we should expect that dealers charge referral customers higher prices—not lower
prices as claimed by Internet referral services.
2.2 Selection
Even if we observe that average online prices are lower than average oﬄine prices, it could still
be the case that a referral site has no eﬀect on the price a particular consumer receives. Sup-
pose that Autobytel.com consumers would have obtained information from books and friends
in the absence of the Internet, or that these are customers who are already good bargainers
(“cowboys”). Then Autobytel.com might simply substitute for other information sources and
mechanisms which existed before the advent of the Internet; consumers could be paying the
same prices they would have without the Internet, but because these consumers disproportion-
ately use the Internet, Internet prices are lower than average.
Note, however, that the selection eﬀect could also work in the opposite direction from that
just described. Suppose that Autobytel.com users have a high personal cost to collecting infor-
mation and bargaining. Such consumers know that they will pay a relatively high oﬄine price
for a car because they ﬁnd it costly to, for example, comparison shop and haggle (“cowards”).
If so, they will beneﬁt more than will an average buyer from a service that provides information
and “bargains” on their behalf. This may cause them to be more likely to use Autobytel.com.
7Notice that if the consumers who use Autobytel.com are not a random sample of the popu-
lation, we can infer whether it is the ‘cowboys’ or ‘cowards’ who choose to use the Internet from
whether the estimated coeﬃcient on Internet usage rises or falls when moving from a speciﬁca-
tion that does not control for selection (OLS) to a speciﬁcation that does (IV). This inference
also indicates whether the Internet has a real eﬀect on the division of surplus in car retailing.
For example, a drop in the estimated Autobytel.com coeﬃcient when moving from OLS to IV
implies both that the causal eﬀect of the Internet is negative, and that consumers who use
Internet referral services would have paid above average prices had they not used the Internet.
We can conclude that the Internet has redistributed surplus from dealers to customers. If
controlling for selection increases the estimate of the average price paid by a referred consumer
to zero, then consumers who use Internet referral services are simply “savvy bargainers” and
Autobytel.com has no causal eﬀect on the distribution of surplus in car retailing.
3 Data
Our data come from a major supplier of marketing research information (henceforth MRI) and
Autobytel.com. MRI collects transaction data from a sample of dealers in the major metropoli-
tan areas in the US. We have data containing every new car transaction at these dealerships
from January 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000.6 These data include customer information, the
make, model and trim level of the car, ﬁnancing information, trade-in information, dealer-added
extras, and the proﬁtability of the car and the customer to the dealership.
We add to these data information on whether a consumer submitted a purchase request
using Autobytel.com during 1999. We consider a match between observations from Autoby-
tel.com and MRI when either the geocoded address or the phone number associated with the
referral and the purchase transaction are the same. Each observation in the new dataset is a
transaction from the MRI data, augmented by the information from the Autobytel.com data
if there was a match.7 We deﬁne four variables that measure Internet usage and subsequent
purchase decisions. The ﬁrst variable is an indicator variable for an Autobytel.com customer
(Autobytel), which marks whether the customer who purchased the car submitted a purchase
request using Autobytel.com. The unit of observation is a transaction, not a referral, and this
variable is equal to 1 for any customer who requested a referral, whether or not the transaction
6We include an additional two months of transaction data to capture consumers who asked for a referral in
1999 but did not ﬁnalize the transaction until 2000. While most referrals result in transactions within a few
days, some take longer. For example, some consumers ask for referrals for multiple cars over time before buying
a vehicle.
7We cannot analyze the purchase choices of non-matching Autobytel.com customers as we do not know
whether they purchased a car and if they have, what car they purchased.
8was at the dealership to which the customer was referred. The second variable we create is an
indicator variable for an Autobytel.com franchise dealer (AutobytelFranchise), which indicates
whether the dealer that sold the car is an Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealer. Aﬃliation means
that the dealer is under contract with Autobytel.com and receives purchase requests. The
third indicator is SameDealer and marks cases in which the dealer that sold the car is the
same dealer to which the purchase request was submitted. Note that SameDealer can equal
1 only if Autobytel=1. The ﬁnal indicator variable, ChangeCar, marks whether the make and
model an Autobytel.com user bought diﬀers from the make and model for which she obtained
a referral. Autobytel.com was the leading Internet referral service in 1999 with slightly over 2
million referrals.8 However, since there are online referral services other than Autobytel.com,
the customers in the combined dataset who are not identiﬁed as using Autobytel.com may have
used one of its competitors. This biases our empirical result against ﬁnding lower prices for
Internet users since we will be comparing a group that used Autobytel.com with a group that
may include users of competing services.
Within the group that used Autobytel.com, about half of consumers buy a make and model
for which they did not request a purchase referral. For most of the results that follow, we restrict
ourselves to observations in which an Autobytel.com user purchased a make and model for which
she requested a referral.9 Restricting ourselves to these consumers who are informed about the
car they buy makes for the cleanest comparison between more informed Autobytel.com users
and less informed non-users. Thus, the main dataset, results, and summary statistics exclude
the consumers who buy a make and model diﬀerent from the one they requested. Later in
the paper we return to considering the remaining Autobytel.com consumers. After dropping
observations with missing data, our main dataset has 620,641 transactions at 3514 dealerships.
Summary statistics are in the Appendix.
3.1 Dependent variable
The price observed in the dataset is the price that the customer pays for the vehicle including
factory installed accessories and options and the dealer-installed accessories contracted for at
the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car.10 The Price variable we use as
8Autobytel.com had between 45 and 50% market share of online car shopping in 1999 (LA Times, 3/28/2000,
“Mergers and Acquisitions Report,” Securities Data Publishing 6/12/2000). According to J.D. Power and As-
sociates (2000b), Autobytel.com is the most visited purchase referral site. It is visited by 33% of consumers that
researched online to shop for a car, followed by Autoweb.com (18%), and Carpoint.com (17%).
9For those consumers who ask for multiple referrals, we consider that they are informed about the car they
buy if any one of their referral requests matches the purchased car.
10Dealer-installed accessories that contribute to the resale value include items such as upgraded tires or a
sound system, but would exclude options such as undercoating or waxing.
9the dependent variable is this price, minus the ManufacturerRebate, if any, given directly to the
consumer, and minus what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. TradeInOverAllowance is
the diﬀerence between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the estimated
wholesale value of the trade-in vehicle (as booked by the dealer). We adjust for this amount to
account for the possibility, for example, that dealers may oﬀer consumers a low price for the
new car because they are proﬁting from the trade-in.
3.2 Controls
We control for car ﬁxed eﬀects. A “car” in our sample is the interaction of make, model, body
type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level. This leaves 834 thus-deﬁned
cars after dropping cars with fewer than 300 sales. We exclude these data because the smaller
number of observations limits what we learn from these cars and because we want to be able
to estimate car ﬁxed eﬀects. While our car ﬁxed eﬀects will control for most of the factors that
contribute to the price of a car, it will not control for the factory- and dealer-installed options
which vary within trim level. The price we observe covers such options but we do not observe
what options the car actually has. In order to control for price diﬀerences caused by options, we
include as an explanatory variable the percent deviation of the dealer’s cost of purchasing the
vehicle from the average vehicle cost of that car in the dataset. This percent deviation, called
VehicleCost will be positive when the car has an unobserved option (for example a CD player)
and is therefore relatively expensive compared to other examples of the same car as speciﬁed
above. The measure also takes into account any variation in holdback and transportation
charges.
To control for time variation in prices, we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if
the car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. A dummy variable WeekEnd speciﬁes
whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday to control for a similar, weekly eﬀect.
In addition, we introduce dummies for each month in the 14 month sample period to control
for other seasonal eﬀects and for inﬂation. If there are volume targets or sales on weekends,
near the end of the month, or seasonally, we will pick them up with these variables.
We control for the number of months between a car’s introduction (as a new model) and
when it was sold. This proxies for how new a car design is and also for the dealer’s opportunity
cost of not selling the car. Judging by the distribution of sales after car introductions, we
distinguish between sales in the ﬁrst four months, months 5-13, and month 14 and later and
assign a dummy variable to each category.
We control for the competitiveness of each dealer’s market. For each dealership we count
the number of dealerships with the same nameplate that fall in a zip code that is within a 10
10mile radius of the zip code of the focal dealership. We control for cases where one owner owns
several franchises, by counting only the number of separately-controlled entities.
We also control for many demographic variables (such as income, education, occupation,
race, etc.) of buyers by using census data that MRI matches with the buyer’s address from
the transaction record. The data is on the level of a “block group,” which makes up about one
fourth of the area and population of a census tract. On average, block groups have about 1100
people in them. Finally, we control the region in which the car was sold.
3.3 Summary statistics
We present descriptive statistics by whether a consumer used Autobytel.com to get a price quote
for the make and model car they purchased. Table 1 on page 32 shows that 3.1% of the buyers
in the sample used Autobytel.com, while 24% of the cars in the sample are sold at dealerships
that have a contract with Autobytel.com.11 Of consumers in the sample, 40% trade in a vehicle,
and 75% obtain some amount of dealer ﬁnancing. About 36% of customers are female, and the
average age of all buyers in the sample is 44. Among consumers who used Autobytel.com, 28%
buy from the dealer they were referred to (see Table 2). The average price of the cars bought
by Autobytel.com consumers is slightly higher and their TradeInOverAllowance, the amount
the dealer subsidizes the trade-in, is considerably lower. The gross proﬁt margin does not diﬀer
greatly between online and oﬄine sales. The average oﬄine car earns a dealer $1438 compared
to $1382 for a sale through Autobytel.com.
Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealers are clearly diﬀerent from others (see Table 3). They are
larger, fewer of their sales involve a trade-in vehicle, and they are located in areas that are
slightly more competitive. Autobytel.com franchises have customers who are from higher in-
come neighborhoods, but on average, they serve people from minority census tracts as often as
other dealerships. The average age of customers at the two types of dealerships is similar.
4 Price Estimation
Our primary interest is whether use of Autobytel.com alters the average price a consumer
pays for her car. In this section we use a standard hedonic regression to estimate whether
Autobytel.com users pay diﬀerent prices than other consumers. In the next section we control
for selection and contrast the OLS and IV results. We follow the hedonic pricing literature
(for example Fisher, Griliches, and Kaysen (1962)) and work with ln(Price) as our dependent
11This proportion of Autobytel.com users approximately doubles if one includes those who purchase a car
diﬀerent from the one for which they requested a purchase referral.
11variable.12 We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Pricei) = α1Autobyteli + α2AutobytelFranchisei + βXi + i
The X matrix is composed of transaction and car variables: car, month, and region ﬁxed
eﬀects, controls for model recency, whether the consumer traded in a vehicle, and car cost.
4.1 Full sample results
Prices paid by Autobytel.com users are 1% lower than those paid by other customers (see
column 1 in Table 4). This estimate is smaller than the 1.5% we found in an earlier paper in
which we had data only from California (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001).
Purchasing from an Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealer, regardless of what channel was used to
buy the car, is associated with a price that is lower by about 0.5%, unchanged from our earlier
estimates.
The second column of Table 4 adds demographics. Because an individual buyer is assigned
the demographic characteristics of her census block group, the explanatory variables are either
a probability that a characteristic applies to the customer (such as %CollegeGraduates) or
an average/median (such as MedianHHIncome). The two exceptions to this are Age, which
is the actual age of the customer, Over64, which is a dummy indicating if the person’s age
is above 64, and Female, which is inferred by MRI based on an analysis of the buyer’s ﬁrst
name. We use all the census demographics to predict price as well as two interactions. The
ﬁrst is Female interacted with Over64, while the second is %Black interacted with (500 -
MedianHouseValue).13
The Autobytel.com results in column two are very similar to those in column one. The
Autobytel.com coeﬃcient falls slightly in magnitude to -.89%. Again, buyers who purchase at
an Autobytel.com franchise pay lower prices. The demographic coeﬃcients have the expected
signs. In particular, older people pay more for cars (0.2% increase if age moves from 20 to
64) until a consumer hits retirement age, whereupon a negative indicator variable of -0.16%
takes eﬀect. People who have a higher probability of being a disadvantaged minority (black
and Hispanic) pay more. An increase from zero to one hundred percent Hispanic in a census
tract raises the expected price of the car by 1.1%. The same increase in percent black in a
neighborhood with housing prices one standard deviation below the mean results in a 1.2%
12Many of the attributes of the car, such as being sold in Northern California or in December, are more
appropriately modeled as a percentage of the car’s value instead of a ﬁxed dollar increment.
13MedianHouseValue refers to the median house value in a census block group and is measured in $1000. 500
is the maximum MedianHouseValue over all census block groups.
12increase in transaction price on average. For more details on the eﬀect of race on car prices, see
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003). Women pay about 0.2% more than do men
for a given car. We expect income and education to be correlated, and we also expect them to
have opposite eﬀects on car prices. High income indicates a lower elasticity of demand, while
high educational levels may make a person a more eﬀective bargainer. Hence, we have few priors
on the signs of these neighborhood variables. They are mostly signiﬁcant: more income and
high house values are associated with lower car prices, while consumers in a more “professional”
neighborhood pay higher prices. Home ownership, a proxy for good credit, is associated with
lower prices. Buyers from neighborhoods with a higher proportion of %CollegeGraduates pay
lower prices, as we expected, while an increase of ten percent in the probability of not ﬁnishing
high school in a census tract is associated with an increase in a resident’s price by 0.03% on
average.
4.2 Results by vehicle segment
We ﬁnd that there is considerable variation in the Autobytel.com discount by vehicle subseg-
ment (see Table 5). MRI separates the cars in the dataset into sixteen subsegments such as
“compact pickup” and “premium sporty.” Four subsegments—Basic Large, Luxury SUV, Near
Luxury, and Premium Sporty—have Autobytel.com coeﬃcients that are smaller than one-half
percent (the Traditional Luxury subsegment has an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, though it is larger
that 0.5 in magnitude.) Consumers may have received little or no Autobytel.com discount
because there was strong demand for the cars in these subsegments in 1999. We check for the
strength of demand in a subsegment by comparing average DaysToTurn across subsegments.
This variable measures how long a car sits on a dealer’s lot and therefore how popular it is. The
subsegments with the fastest turnover (lowest median days to turn) are: International Luxury
(11), Luxury SUV (10), Near Luxury (14), and Premium Sporty (10). (For comparison, the
median subsegment in terms of median days to turn, Premium Compact, has a median number
of days to turn of 25.) This list includes three out of the four subsegments with the lowest
Autobytel.com discounts. The Basic Large subsegment does not have excess demand by this
metric, but the segment is very small and dominated by institutional purchases (Police De-
partments), and is therefore atypical. Consumers who buy cars in the “entry” and “compact”
subsegments such as “Compact Pickup,” “Entry Sporty,” “Premium Compact,” and “Entry
Compact” receive the largest Autobytel.com discount. It appears that the Autobytel.com co-
eﬃcient is largest for car categories that are not supply constrained.
134.3 Competitive Eﬀects
Prices are higher when dealers are in areas with fewer other dealers of the same nameplate (see
column 1 in Table 6). Moving from zero to ten other dealers of the same nameplate within
ten miles lowers the average price by approximately 0.3% ($69 on the average car). This eﬀect
may be small because our data do not include sales in rural areas, so we do not have as much
variation in market structure as do some other studies.
We are also curious as to whether Autobytel.com creates an eﬀect similar to adding another
competitor to the marketplace. For example, in a concentrated local market, the availability of
getting a price quote over the web might be equivalent to increasing competition in the local
market. If so, we would expect the price discount obtained by using Autobytel.com to be higher
in less competitive markets. As the market becomes more competitive, the addition of another
competitor should have less eﬀect on equilibrium prices (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991).
The institutional role of Autobytel.com suggests that Autobytel.com could also have the
opposite eﬀect. Bargaining over price may eﬀectively occur between the dealer and Autoby-
tel.com, in addition to between the customer and the dealer. In such a case, more dealers in
an area will strengthen the hand of Autobytel.com because it can credibly threaten to move its
franchise to another dealer more easily. A greater density of dealers may allow Autobytel.com
to more easily pressure dealers into oﬀering lower prices to consumers. We ﬁnd that the inter-
action between Autobytel.com and the number of dealers of the same nameplate in the area
is negative (see column 2 in Table 6). It appears that Autobytel.com has more inﬂuence on
dealer pricing in more competitive markets, and that this eﬀect is larger in magnitude than
that of the simple competition measure.
4.4 Discussion
The results show that dealerships that contract with an Internet referral service set lower oﬄine
prices than do other dealerships, and that consumers who submit a purchase request pay a lower
price than do other consumers at that dealership. Any potential convenience and income eﬀect
is dominated by price-reducing eﬀects. Online consumers who buy through Autobytel.com pay
on average 1% less than do oﬄine consumers, for the same car. On average, consumers who shop
at an Autobytel.com contract dealer gain slightly relative to shopping at a non-Autobytel.com
contract dealer. The payoﬀ from using Autobytel.com increases as the local market becomes
more competitive.
To test for whether the volume-based compensation that Autobytel.com encourages for
Internet salespeople may be contributing to lower prices, we limit the sample to cars purchased
on the last two days of the month. The volume incentives facing dealers on those days are
14similar to the volume incentives Autobytel.com suggests dealers use for salespeople handling
its leads. Thus the two groups should be more similar at this time of the month if part of what
is driving the Autobytel.com “discount” is salesperson behavior. We ﬁnd only a small drop in
the Autobytel.com coeﬃcient to about -.78% in this speciﬁcation (see column 3 in Table 4).
Since much of the previously estimated Autobytel.com discount remains when estimated on a
sample of cars which are all sold under volume-based incentives, this suggests that volume-based
compensation plays only a small role in the lower prices paid by Autobytel.com consumers.
5 Selection
Thus far we have not attempted to discriminate between two diﬀerent interpretations of the
ﬁnding that Autobytel.com customers pay less: (1) the referral service attracts consumers who
subsequently pay lower prices than they would have if Autobytel.com had not been available, or
(2) the referral service attracts consumers who would have paid the same prices in the absence
of the Internet because they would have used other means to obtain a low price. Formally,
consider the following set of equations where C is an individual speciﬁc characteristic that is
unobserved and forms part of the error term.
Autobyteli = γZi + αCi + µi = γZi + 1i (1)
ln(Pricei) = φAutobyteli + βXi + δCi + νi = φAutobyteli + βXi + 2i (2)
Suppose C is the ability to gather information and use it in the bargaining process. This
characteristic (“cowboy”) causes the buyer to use Autobytel.com to strengthen her bargaining
position, leading to positive α and a negative δ. Since C is unobserved, Autobytel will be
correlated with equation 2’s error term. In this scenario the estimated coeﬃcient on Autobytel
will be negatively biased relative to the true coeﬃcient.
The selection eﬀect could also work in the opposite direction. Suppose that characteristic
C indicated that the buyer has high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining
(“coward”). Then α would be positive, but δ would be positive also. Hence, the estimated
Autobytel.com coeﬃcient will be biased upward and the true savings from using the service
will be larger than the OLS estimates. This latter direction of the selection eﬀect is consistent
with new car buyers behaving rather like standard adopters of a new technology over time.14
The agents – consumers in our case – who are ﬁrst to adopt the new technology, an Internet
referral service, have the most to gain because they would pay a high price in the traditional
14This literature is traditionally focused on ﬁrms, for example, farming (Griliches 1957) and steel (Oster 1982).
15channel.
5.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation
In order to estimate the true eﬀect of Autobytel.com usage on price, we use an instrumental
variables procedure. The unobserved characteristic that could potentially determine both Au-
tobytel.com usage and negotiated prices is an individual’s ability or desire to price negotiate,
for example by gathering information and using it in the bargaining process. Our instruments
must therefore predict usage of Autobytel.com but be uncorrelated with this characteristic. In
other research settings demographic information can be used to predict Internet usage. In the
case of negotiated prices, however, almost all demographic indicators (for example, income or
education) are likely also to be correlated with price, making it particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd
good instruments.
Instruments for Autobytel: We introduce a series of instruments for Autobytel. For each
instrument we detail (1) why we think that this instrument is correlated with Autobytel.com
usage and (2) why we think that this instrument is uncorrelated with an individual consumer’s
ability or desire to bargain.
Our ﬁrst instrument is the number of franchises which have a contract with Autobytel.com
and are in close proximity to the consumer. Speciﬁcally we count the number of Autobytel.com
contract franchises which are in a zip code whose centroid is within 5 miles of the centroid of the
zip code the consumer resides in. This instrument is likely to be correlated with whether con-
sumers use Autobytel.com due to worth of mouth. We expect that more neighboring consumers
will have successfully used Autobytel.com referrals if more Autobytel.com contract dealers are
close by. This is because such customers are more likely to have have purchased from an Au-
tobytel.com contract dealer after a referral, or have been able to use a competitive oﬀer from
a close Autobytel.com contract dealer to negotiate with a non-aﬃliated dealer. We also expect
that this instrument proxies for whether consumers use Autobytel.com due to local Autoby-
tel.com advertising that drives consumers online (which, unlike national advertising, we cannot
measure). The number of close Autobytel.com contract franchises is unlikely to be correlated
with consumer’s ability to bargain. Our conversation with Autobytel.com managers did not
indicate that during 1996-1999 the company took regional variations in consumers’ ability to
bargain into account when signing up dealers.
Our second set of instruments is based on the regional price variation of the car the consumer
is purchasing. Speciﬁcally, we include two coeﬃcients of variation for the price of the car the
consumer buys. We construct these instruments as follows: First we run our standard hedonic
price regression on all non-Autobytel observations. For each geographic region we then calculate
16the standard deviation of the estimated residual from this regression for all transactions of a
speciﬁc car. We also calculate the mean price for the same car in each region. To construct the
instrument we divide the standard deviation of the residuals for each car for each region by the
mean price of the corresponding car for the corresponding region. We calculate this coeﬃcient of
variation at the level of the car deﬁnition used in the regression ﬁxed eﬀects (PriceVariation1).
We also calculate it for the next level of aggregation by combining engine sizes of the same car
(PriceVariation2). Whether or not consumers decide to request a referral from Autobytel.com
is likely to be driven by the price oﬀers they receive from dealers as they begin searching for
a car and therefore correlated with our price variation measures. Whether higher or lower
price variation is correlated with using Autobytel depends on the decision process consumers
follow. For example, consumers who have not been able to ﬁnd a comparatively low price after
several enquiries at dealers may decide that visiting additional dealers is not going to yield a
low price oﬀer and thus try a online referral as an alternative way to obtain a low price. In this
case we would expect that lower price variation is associated with a higher probability of using
Autobytel.com. Alternatively, consumers who receive strongly varying price oﬀers from dealers
during their initial search may interpret this as evidence that a referral from Autobytel.com will
be particularly beneﬁcial. In this case we would expect that higher price variation is associated
with a higher probability of using Autobytel.com. These measures will be uncorrelated with
an individual consumer‘s ability to bargain because, even if consumers with a higher ability to
bargain systematically buy particular cars, the common price eﬀect would be absorbed by the
car ﬁxed eﬀects in the price equation.
Our third instrument is the number of transactions in the sample for a particular “car”
(#ofCarsSold). The popularity of certain bundles of characteristics should aﬀect the beneﬁt
to searching for the car on the Internet and therefore the likelihood of doing so. How the
popularity of certain bundles of characteristics will be correlated with a higher probability to
use Autobytel depends on the decision process consumers follow. For example, consumers who
believe that dealers use Autobytel.com to sell cars without haggling and at low prices might
expect that the more common car conﬁgurations are more likely to be sold under this model,
while rare conﬁgurations are sold with negotiation to consumers who are speciﬁcally looking for
them. Alternatively, consumers may assume that more popular cars are easier to search for at
multiple dealers, leading to fewer opportunities to ﬁnd a lower price using Autobytel.com. Note
that we eliminated extremely rare cars from the sample; #ofCarsSold is always 300 or larger.
#ofCarsSold will be uncorrelated with a consumer’s ability to bargain because the measure is
constant across consumers within a car type. Hence, even if consumers with a higher ability
to bargain systematically chose more or less popular cars, the price eﬀect would be absorbed
by the car ﬁxed eﬀects in the price equation. Since #ofCarsSold is constant within a car type,
17one might think that the car ﬁxed eﬀects in the price regression would cause this instrument
to be unable to identify the eﬀect of Autobytel across consumers within a car. However, the
marginal impact of #ofCarsSold is constant only within the probit index. Because of the
nonlinearity of the probit index, the marginal eﬀect of the measure on the probability of using
Autobytel.com are will diﬀer across consumers because they diﬀer in other characteristics in
the index. Thus the eﬀect of #ofCarsSold on the probability of using Autobytel will be higher
for some demographic combinations. However, these demographic combinations are not a
source of unobserved price variation; all demographics are included in the price regression.
There is no reason we can think of that would cause #ofCarsSold to be correlated with the
non-demographic, unobservable ability to bargain which is a component of price.
Our fourth instrument is a measure of Autobytel’s national television advertising spend-
ing.15 This instrument varies by week but not by location. This instrument will be correlated
with Autobytel.com usage if the advertising is likely to inform consumers about the existence
of Autobytel and persuades some to request a referral. Thus, the instrument should predict
Autobytel.com usage over time. It seems reasonable to assume that this instrument is un-
correlated with price and an individual’s ability to bargain: given the relatively small size of
Autobytel.com in 1999, we do not expect dealers to condition their prices on Autobytel’s ad-
vertising schedule. Ideally we would like to match the date of advertising spending to the date
of a given referral. However, since we do not observe a consumer’s decision not to obtain a
referral, such matching is not possible, and so we must rely on the purchase date of a vehicle
instead. The measure that best predicts referrals is the sum of advertising spending two and
three weeks before the vehicle purchase, and this is what we use as an instrument.16
Lastly, we interact some of the above instruments with demographic measures and com-
petition. For example, there is evidence that men are more likely to watch the sports and
late-night TV that comprised much of the Autobytel.com advertising spending. So we create
an additional instrument which is the advertising measure interacted with the buyer’s gender
(1-Female). We also conjecture that educated consumers will know better when obtaining an
Autobytel referral is more valuable as a function of a car’s price variation. So we interact the
coeﬃcient of variation for a car with %CollegeGraduates. Lastly, we interact our measure of
how common car conﬁgurations are (#ofCarsSold) with the level of dealer competition in the
surrounding area. The rationale for this interaction is that the savings in search costs of using
15Due to conﬁdentiality concerns, the unit of measurement was not given to us but remains constant across
all 58 weeks (1999-Feb 2000) (Mean=2.58; Std.Dev.=2.38; Min.=0; Max.=7.5)
16If a consumer purchased a car on Monday through Wednesday we use as instrument for Autobytel.com usage
the sum of the ﬁrm’s advertising expenditure two and three weeks prior to the purchase date. If a consumer
purchased a car on Thursday through Sunday we use as the instrument the sum of the Autobytel.com’s advertising
expenditure one and two weeks prior to the purchase date.
18Autobytel for more common car conﬁgurations should decline if there are many local dealers.
We experimented with instruments from the Current Population Survey Internet and Com-
puter Use Supplement. For example, owning a computer and having high speed Internet access
in one’s geographic area clearly lower the cost of using Autobytel.com, and not surprisingly, help
predict who uses the service. However, they also predict the price a consumer pays for her car,
so we could not use them as instruments. (Formal overidentiﬁcation tests of our instruments
are reported below.)
Instruments for AutobytelFranchise: We also require an instrument for AutobytelFran-
chise. This is because consumers who have requested an Autobytel.com referral are more
likely to end up purchasing from an Autobytel.com contract dealer than is the average oﬄine
consumer. Since Autobytel.com franchise usage is correlated with Autobytel.com usage, and
Autobytel is correlated with the error term in the price equation, so is AutobytelFranchise. We
would like an instrument that is correlated with the propensity of an individual to purchase
a car at an Autobytel.com contract dealer but is uncorrelated with the individual’s ability or
desire to bargain. For our instrument, we calculate how much closer the consumer lives to the
closest dealer of the make he or she purchased than to the nearest Autobytel.com aﬃliated
dealer of the same make. This variable is correlated with whether a consumer purchases at an
Autobytel.com contract dealer because it measures the additional distance a consumer needs to
travel to get to the closest Autobytel.com dealer of the relevant make. We also include a mea-
sure of the absolute distance to the closest dealer of the relevant make. It seems unlikely that
consumers’ ability or desire to bargain determines their relative distance to an Autobytel.com
franchise or to car dealers in general.
Estimation: Our estimation procedure follows that of Wooldridge (Econometric Analysis
of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2002, page 623) for the case of dichotomous endogenous
variables.17 In particular, we estimate the determinants of Internet use using a probit regression
of Autobytel on our instruments and all exogenous variables in the price regression. We also
estimate a second probit regression of AutobytelFranchise on our instruments and all exogenous
variables in the price regression. We use both predicted probabilities as the instruments for
Autobytel and AutobytelFranchise in the price regression.18 Wooldridge (2002) details the
properties of the estimator and notes that two of its virtues are that the usual IV standard
17Other papers proposing estimation strategies for similar problems include Angrist (2001) and Heckman
(1978).
18One can also include the original instruments linearly in addition to the predicted probability and obtain
almost identical results.
19errors are correct, and that the estimator is robust to mis-speciﬁcation of the probit model.
We report the estimates from the probit regressions in Table 7.
In the Autobytel equation we ﬁnd, as predicted, that the number of Autobytel.com fran-
chises in the local area is positively related to whether consumers request a referral from
Autobytel.com. Variation in the price (PriceVariation1) of the focal car is positively related to
Autobytel.com usage while variation in price in the next most aggregated car (PriceVariation2)
has a negative eﬀect on Autobytel.com usage. The cumulative eﬀect is negative in price varia-
tion, consistent with consumers who have not been able to ﬁnd a comparatively low price after
several enquiries at dealers deciding that visiting additional dealers is not going to yield a low
price oﬀer and thus trying an online referral as an alternative way to obtain a low price. The
eﬀect is the opposite for college educated buyers PriceVariation2*%CollegeGraduates; these
buyers may be aware of the price distribution for their car of interest before searching, and use
Autobytel when the returns are greatest. We ﬁnd that consumers are more likely to request an
Autobytel.com referral for more common car conﬁgurations. This is consistent with consumers
believing that the most common car conﬁgurations are the ones that are most likely to be sold
under a model in which dealers use Autobytel.com to sell cars without haggling and at low
prices. This eﬀect is attenuated when there are many dealers in the local area. Finally, the
advertising measures are not signiﬁcant. This could be because there is large heterogeneity in
the length of time between a referral and the car purchase; 25% of consumers buy a car within
7 days of their referral, half within 22 days, and 75% within 72 days. Since we have to match
the week of advertising spending to the purchase date and not the referral date, any given
lag with which we construct the advertising instrument will predict referrals poorly for some
consumers. Other variables enter the ﬁrst stage in expected ways. For example, young people,
better educated people, and those in neighborhoods with a high share of technical workers are
more likely to use Autobytel. Men, especially young men, are more likely to use Autobytel,
while minorities, especially those in neighborhoods with low housing values, are less likely to
use Autobytel. The pseudo R-squared is 0.06, indicating that there is substantial unexplained
variation in Internet use.
The regression of AutobytelFranchise is similar, with the exception that the instruments
explain more of the variation (pseudo R-squared is 0.1). The incremental distance between
the Autobytel.com dealer and the closest non-Autobytel.com dealer is highly signiﬁcant (and
negative, as expected) in explaining AutobytelFranchise use. A one standard deviation increase
in relative distance changes the probability that a consumers buys at an Autobytel franchise
dealer by -0.18. The closer the closest dealer of the relevant nameplate is to the consumer’s
address, the lower the probability that the consumers will purchase at an Autobytel franchise
dealer (which is further away on average).
20IV results and robustness: The results from the 2SLS speciﬁcation follow in Table 8. The
estimated coeﬃcient on AutobytelFranchise is -2.41% while the coeﬃcient on AutobytelFran-
chise increases in magnitude to -1.01%. Both estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
a 1% signiﬁcance level. In this and all subsequent speciﬁcations the instruments pass a test of
overidentifying restrictions described in Hausman (1983). The test statistic is N ∗ R2 from a
regression of the IV errors on all the exogenous variables in the system. It is distributed χ2
with K-1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number of instruments.
We include in the remainder of Table 8 the estimated Autobytel coeﬃcient with one instru-
ment and its interactions excluded in each estimation. The Autobytel coeﬃcient is robust to
most combinations and varies between -2.13 and -2.69; the exception to this is the case where
the advertising variable and its interactions are excluded. Then the coeﬃcient increases to
-2.96. The AutobytelFranchise coeﬃcient is very precisely estimated (t-stats of approximately
18) because distance is such a good instrument for this variable. It varies very little across
combinations of Autobytel instruments.
5.2 Discussion
A consumer buying through Autobytel.com is estimated to save 2.4%, corresponding to over
$500 on the average car. This is larger in magnitude than the OLS point estimate. We conclude
that the negative sign of the OLS coeﬃcient is not an artifact of selection of savvy consumers
into use of the Internet. Rather, it appears that the lower prices associated with Autobytel.com
usage are caused by Internet use. This implies a change in the overall distribution of prices.
Below we plot the distributions of prices in the two channels to see how they are aﬀected.
Figure 1 on page 43 plots the distribution of residuals from our basic price regression
(column 2 in Table 4 excluding Autobytel.com related explanatory variables). Residuals from
Autobytel.com sales are plotted below those of non-Autobytel.com sales. The distribution of
residuals for Autobytel.com sales is of lower mean and variance than those of “street” sales.
Notice also that the Autobytel.com distribution has a much thinner upper tail than the non-
Autobytel.com distribution. The lower tails of the two distributions are very similar. This is
what we would expect to see if consumers who would have paid an above average price pay a
price closer to the mean after using the Internet.
Notice also that the diﬀerence between the OLS and the IV estimates indicates that con-
sumers who use Autobytel.com would have paid above average prices oﬄine. Taking the coef-
ﬁcients at face value, the OLS estimates indicate that consumers who use Autobytel.com pay
approximately .9% below the average for the rest of the sample for a given car. The IV esti-
mates, which correct for selection and, under the identifying assumptions, consistently estimate
21the true treatment eﬀect, estimate the eﬀect of Autobytel.com usage on price at approximately
2.4%. In order to reconcile a treatment eﬀect of 2.4% with an average eﬀect of 0.9%, it must
be that Autobytel.com consumers should have paid about 1.5% above the average in the rest
of the sample, had they not used Autobytel.com. While this diﬀerence suggests that it is the
“cowards” who are disproportionately likely to use Autobytel.com, the statistical precision of
our results does not allow us to conclude this deﬁnitively. In particular, the OLS estimate
of Autobytel would be excluded only by the 91% (not the 95%) conﬁdence interval of the IV
estimate (from a Wald test of the hypothesis that the IV estimate is equal to 0.9%). Since we
would like more evidence on this critical point, we now turn to direct measures of customer
types and Internet usage.
5.3 Evidence from survey data
We want to determine whether consumers who consider themselves disadvantaged in the tradi-
tional face-to-face bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet. Since our large dataset
of transactions lacks information which would allow us to directly measure a consumer’s cost
of bargaining or collecting information, we have gathered a second set of data which contains
such measures. These data also contain information on whether consumers used the Internet to
shop for a car. We can therefore relate consumer types to their likelihood of using the Internet.
Data: We mailed a survey instrument to 5250 consumers who purchased one of eight popular
new car models in California during April and May 2002. The survey asked questions about
buyers’ search and bargaining behavior as well as their personal attitudes towards bargaining
and information search (see Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2006) for more details
and a list of questions used in this paper).
We chose our sample by car type and then mailed the survey to every consumer of the
selected car types who had purchased a car in April and May 2002 at a sample of dealers. The
objective in selecting car types was to include a variety of car categories (e.g. midsize sedan,
luxury sedan, pickup, SUV, etc.). This is because we knew from earlier results that Internet
search could aﬀect diﬀerent car categories diﬀerently. We added the purchases of the most
common cars for a variety of car categories until we reached our desired sample size. This
yielded the most popular variants of the following cars: Honda Accord, Chrysler PT Cruiser,
Nissan Altima, Chevrolet Silverado, Toyota Corolla, Jeep Grand Cherokee, Honda Odyssey,
and Chevrolet Tahoe.
Each potential respondent received three mailings. The ﬁrst mailing contained a letter
announcing the arrival of the survey, introducing ourselves as the researchers and explaining
the purpose of the project. The second mailing was sent out 5 days later and contained a
22cover letter, the survey, a pre-stamped return envelope, and a $1 bill. The third mailing was
sent out 5 days after the second mailing and consisted of a postcard thanking buyers for their
participation and reminding them to return the survey. We achieved a response rate of 47%.
Which consumers types are more likely to use the Internet? In our survey we asked
consumers to rate their agreement or disagreement with a list of statements to get a measure of
three consumer traits that we thought, ex ante, could be the unobserved characteristic in our
model. These traits are (1) whether a consumer has a high disutility of bargaining, (2) whether
a consumer has a high willingness to search, and (3) whether a consumer is a knowledgeable
about cars. To get answers that are reliable and as comparable as possible across respondents,
we ask survey participants questions about their behavior or attitudes, not about the traits
directly. For example, we are interested in the “car knowledge” trait to control for whether a
consumer knows a lot about cars, even if they did little or no search for their car purchase. We
asked questions like “I read car- and/or truck-enthusiast magazines regularly” and “I tend to
visit dealers whenever a new model is introduced.” Similarly, we get at consumers’ willingness
to search with statements such as “I do a lot of price comparison when making large purchases,”
and “I am the kind of person who gathers as much information as possible before visiting car
dealers.” Finally, to assess whether a consumer has a high disutility of bargaining, we present
consumers with statements such as “I am the kind of person who enjoys negotiating the car’s
price with the dealer,” and “I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when
negotiating the price of a new car.” We also assess consumers’ available time to engage in the
bargaining process with the statement “It is hard for me to ﬁnd time to shop for a new vehicle.”
We assess how well the three consumer traits predict Internet usage by including the answers
to the statements directly in probit speciﬁcations of InternetUse and use of Internet referral
services such as Autobytel.com (IRSUse). These speciﬁcations also control for demographics
on a census block group level. Gender is inferred from an analysis of ﬁrst names. Table 1 on
page 32 presents summary statistics for the survey data.19
We ﬁnd support that consumers with a high disutility of bargaining are more likely to go
online (see columns 1 and 2 in Table 10). Respondents who disagree with “I am the kind of
person who enjoys negotiating the car’s price with the dealer” are more likely to use the Internet
and visit the websites of Internet referral services. In addition, we ﬁnd that respondents who
agree with “I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when negotiating the price
of a new car” are more likely to use Internet referral services. We also ﬁnd that consumers
with a lack of time are more likely to use an Internet referral service. Consumers’ response to
19The 1752 observations used in the probit are somewhat smaller than the number of returned surveys because
of missing data.
23“It is hard for me to ﬁnd time to shop for a new vehicle” is positively related to IRSUse.
Not surprisingly, consumers with a high willingness to search are also more likely to go
online. Consumers who agree with “I am the kind of person who gathers as much information
as possible before visiting car dealers,” and with “I am the kind of person who tries to ﬁnd out
the dealer’s invoice price on a car before going to the dealership to shop” are more likely to
use the Internet as well as to use Internet referral services. We ﬁnd that people knowledgeable
about cars are less likely to use the Internet.
Conclusion from the survey The survey ﬁndings are consistent with our conjecture from
the IV results, namely that “cowards” are disproportionately likely to use Autobytel.com: We
ﬁnd in the survey that consumers with a high disutility of bargaining are more likely to go online.
Under the reasonable assumption that such consumers pay higher prices than consumers who
enjoy the bargaining process, this ﬁnding would be consistent with the observed diﬀerence
between our OLS and IV results, namely that the IV coeﬃcient on Autobytel.com usage is
larger in magnitude than the OLS coeﬃcient.
We also ﬁnd that a high willingness to search is associated with higher online usage. Under
the reasonable assumption that such consumers pay lower prices than consumers with a low
willingness to search, the implied selection eﬀect should lead to an OLS coeﬃcient of a larger
magnitude than the IV coeﬃcient of Autobytel.com usage. However, we cannot ﬁnd evidence
in our results that this eﬀect is empirical important.
We conclude that the survey shows evidence of consumer traits which could result in biasing
the Autobytel.com coeﬃcient either way when these traits are not controlled for. Our results
from the transaction data suggest that the selection bias due to the fact that consumers with
a higher disutility of bargaining are more likely to go online dominates the potential selection
bias due to the fact that consumers with a low willingness to search are more likely to go online.
5.4 Invoice prices and selling cost
Our ﬁndings raise the question of whether the lower prices obtained by dealers for online
consumers are oﬀset by lower costs. If this is so, the Internet leads to lower prices without
decreasing dealers’ unit proﬁts. The ﬁrst thing to compare is dealer vehicle margins. We have
shown that Autobytel.com sales to occur at lower prices. If the invoice prices are lower also,
then margins could be preserved. In a levels regression, we ﬁnd that the vehicle costs of Autoby-
tel.com aﬃliated dealerships are on average $64 higher per car than at unaﬃliated dealerships.
In a log regression, costs are higher by 0.29%, or $68 on the average car (see columns 1 and 2 in
Table 11). Although invoice price appear to be higher for Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealerships,
dealer franchise laws require manufacturers to sell the same car at the same price to all dealers
24in a region. The higher vehicle cost observed for Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealerships thus in-
dicates that those dealerships sell cars with more expensive options which are not captured by
our car dummies.20 Since invoice prices are not lower for Autobytel.com dealers, any potential
cost savings from selling to Autobytel.com customers must come out of dealers’ overhead costs.
Autobytel.com may also reduce the selling costs of dealers by increasing the productivity of
a salesperson. Since some of the customer communication is handled by e-mail, a sales person
can potentially spend less time for each sale. Regrettably, we cannot test this hypothesis with
our transaction data because we do not have information on overhead cost. However, we have
no evidence that the lower margins can be fully oﬀset by lower overhead cost.21
6 Car and dealer switching
Having shown that Internet referral services lower prices for retail auto sales, in this section
we attempt to understand better what aspect of a referral enables consumers to obtain a
lower price. We do so by exploiting diﬀerences in make, model, and dealer, between the
Autobytel.com referral and the actual transaction.
6.1 Referral versus transaction dealers
We ﬁrst analyze whether Autobytel.com usage leads to savings only at the dealer to whom
the consumer was referred, or whether the referral is useful for negotiating with other dealers
also. Consumers can take the price quote in response to a referral and the information obtained
during the process, and try to negotiate a low price from a dealer not aﬃliated with the referral
service.
We add to our basic speciﬁcation an indicator identifying those Autobytel.com consumers
who purchased the car from their referred dealer, SameDealer (see column 1 in Table 12). These
consumers are “doing what they are supposed to” from the point of view of the dealer and the
Autobytel.com business model. The coeﬃcient on SameDealer is 0.19%, i.e. consumers who
continue their (costly) search after having received a referral pay slightly less than consumers
who do not continue searching. While this suggests that the information provided by Autoby-
20Because we control for VehicleCost in our price regressions, this has no eﬀect on our previous results.
21In Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) we were able to examine some anecdotal evidence
which leads us to mixed conclusions about whether selling costs are lower for Internet sales. On the one hand
we were able to examine accounting data provided to us by Autobytel.com for a dealer whom we suppose to be
relatively cost eﬃcient. This dealer claimed to have $600 lower selling cost for Internet sales than for traditional
sales. On the other hand, a survey (J.D. Power and Associates (2000a)) found that 51% of dealerships reported
that it took them more man-hours to complete a sale with Internet customers from an Internet referral service
than with traditional customers.
25tel.com is portable, it also suggests that, on average, the beneﬁt to consumers of continuing to
search is small.
6.2 Referred versus purchased make and model
Next, we analyze whether consumer savings from using Autobytel.com are associated with the
mere fact of submitting a referral, or whether it matters that consumers submit a referral for
the speciﬁc make (nameplate) and model that they purchase. We can analyze this question
because 51% of the consumers who use Autobytel.com do not purchase the car for which they
made a purchase request.22 Recall that up until this point in the paper, these buyers were
excluded from the dataset.
We deﬁne these consumers as ChangeCar buyers rather than SameCar buyers. Of these
ChangeCar buyers, 30% end up purchasing a car of the same make (but not model) as the car
for which they made a purchase request. We previously noted that 28% of SameCar consumers
buy from their referred dealer. For consumers who change make and model, only 6.75% buy
from the referred dealer.
To compare a buyer’s requested versus purchased model, we calculate the average price of
each make and model in the dataset. We then compare the prices of the referred cars versus the
purchased cars. We do this for the 79% of buyers who make exactly one referral request. We
ignore the remaining observations because otherwise we would have to choose arbitrarily which
request to analyze. We ﬁnd that buyers who change cars, on average, request a price quote for
a more expensive car than the one they buy. The median ChangeCar consumer buys a car that
costs $500 less and that was on the lot for two more days than the requested car. Consumers
seem to be searching for the lowest price on their “dream car” before resigning themselves to
buying a less expensive alternative. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that consumers who change models
but not dealers, buy cars that are, on average more expensive than the ones they requested.23.
We add a second Autobytel.com variable to our standard price speciﬁcation. Autoby-
tel∗ChangeCar is one if a consumer purchases a diﬀerent make or model than the one re-
quested through Autobytel.com. Autobytel continues to capture the eﬀect of Autobytel.com
for consumers who buy a make and model they requested. The sample size increases by 20,372
observations because we add consumers who purchased a diﬀerent make or model from the one
requested through Autobytel.com.
We ﬁnd that the Autobytel∗ChangeCar coeﬃcient is about half the size of the Autobytel
coeﬃcient, -0.46% versus -0.9% (see column 2 in Table 12). We can further distinguish between
22Our statistic includes consumers who submit multiple referral requests; if any of the requests matches the
car bought, then the consumer is deﬁned as SameCar.
23This may be a version of the “bait and switch” technique found in Ellison and Ellison (2004)
26consumers who change make and model and those who only change model but purchase a car
of the requested nameplate. We ﬁnd that consumer who change make and model receive a
-0.36% discount, those who stay with the same make get -0.7% and those who buy the car they
asked about receive a -0.9% discount (see column 3 in Table 12). Finally, among ChangeCar
consumers, there is no diﬀerence between the price paid by those who purchase from the referred
dealer and those who switch dealership (see column 4 in Table 12).24
The fact that consumers get a bigger price reduction when they have information that is
more relevant to the car they actually purchase suggests that consumers’ bargaining outcomes
are materially improved by the information they obtain on Autobytel.com. If instead Autoby-
tel.com usage were simply a proxy for whether a consumer is a savvy bargainer, the “savvy
bargaining” eﬀect on the price would presumably not vary with whether the consumer ended up
buying the car for which they originally requested a referral. Our ﬁnding that Autobytel.com
usage is not a proxy for good bargaining ability is consistent with our IV results and the results
of the survey.
Finally, this also provides evidence that the Autobytel.com discount is unlikely to be ex-
plained by lower selling costs. If the discount simply reﬂected lower cost, the eﬀect on the price
would presumably not vary with whether the consumer ended up buying the car for which they
originally requested a referral.
7 Conclusion
This paper is concerned with whether the Internet can lower proﬁts for an established oﬄine
industry. In particular, this paper has begun where Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso
(2001) left oﬀ by estimating the ‘treatment eﬀect’ of an Internet referral service, Autobytel.com,
on prices for retail auto sales. Using an instrumental variables approach to control for selec-
tion, we ﬁnd that buying a car through Autobytel.com reduces the price a consumer pays by
approximately 2.4%. This is in contrast to the on average 1% lower prices that online buy-
ers pay compared to oﬄine consumers, for the same car. This suggests that consumers who
use an Internet referral service are not those who would have obtained a low price even in
the absence of the Internet. Instead, our ﬁndings are consistent with consumers choosing to
use Autobytel.com because they know that they would do poorly in the traditional channel.
We ﬁnd support for this conjecture by analyzing survey data that directly measures consumer
traits and Internet use. We ﬁnd that consumers who expressed a high disutility of bargaining
and lack of time were more likely to go online. In the terminology used to distinguish be-
24Recall that for SameCar consumers, buying from the referral dealer is slightly more expensive (and more
convenient) than continuing to price shop (by 0.19%).
27tween the two selection stories, it seems that it is the “cowards,” not the “cowboys” who are
disproportionately likely to use the Internet.
As suggested by our selection results, we ﬁnd that a dealership’s Autobytel.com sales are
associated with a reduction in high margin sales. We also ﬁnd that having a make- and model-
speciﬁc price quote lowers the price a customer pays by more than obtaining general information
from the Internet, or having characteristics associated with Internet usage. This ﬁnding is also
consistent with our selection result, namely that diﬀerences in the characteristics of Internet
and non-Internet users cannot explain the lower prices paid by Autobytel.com consumers.
We cannot conclude deﬁnitively whether the advent of auto Internet referral services ben-
eﬁted Internet consumers. This is because we do not know whether average oﬄine car prices
increased or decreased in reaction to the introduction of these services. If oﬄine prices increased
on average, dealers could oﬀer discounts to Internet users without making these consumers bet-
ter oﬀ than they would have been in the absence of the Internet. However, the number of buyers
who used Internet referral services was small in 1999. Thus, it may not be unreasonable to
assume that overall price levels had not changed as a result of the Internet in 1999. Under
this assumption the consumers in our sample saved $10 million in aggregate. If we extrapolate
the results here from the 3% of the sample that uses Autobytel.com and buys the car they
requested to the portion of the market not covered by the MRI data, the aggregate savings to
Internet consumers could have been about $240 million per year. We do not think that this
result reﬂects a steady state in the US auto industry, since the Internet was relatively new at
the time of our data, and dealers and consumers seem unlikely to have fully adjusted to the
existence of online referral services. However, our results suggest that in our sample period Au-
tobytel.com, and perhaps other referral services, were facilitating a substantial redistribution
of surplus in the retail auto industry.
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30Appendix
Survey questions for Section 5.3
Internet usage measures:
InternetUse: “Did you use the Internet in any way to help you shop for a new vehicle? (e.g.
to research vehicles, ﬁnd a dealer, etc.)” Answer categories: yes/no
IRSUse: “For each source of information on the Internet you used to shop for a new car, please
tell us how it was used:”
Answer categories: “To determine ... which car to purchase, which dealers to visit or buy
from, manufacturer suggested retail price, the dealer cost (invoice/hold- back), fair price or
market value for the car.” The indicator IRSUse is “1” (“0” otherwise) if the respondent
checks any of the response categories for the source of information “Online buying services
(e.g. Autobytel.com, Carpoint.com, Autoweb.com, Cars.com, Carsdirect.com, CarClub.com,
Sam’s or Costco’s Internet Referral service, Driversseat.com, AutoVantage.com, Vehix.com)”
Consumer trait measures:
“Please tell us how you feel about the following statements:”
Answer categories: disagree strongly/disagree/agree/agree strongly
LikeNegotiating: “I am the kind of person who enjoys negotiating the car’s price with the
dealer”
AfraidTakenAdvantage: “I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when nego-
tiating the price of a new car”
NoTimeToShop: “It is hard for me to ﬁnd time to shop for a new vehicle”
DoPriceComparisons: “I do a lot of price comparison when making larger purchases”
GatherMuchInfo: “I am the kind of person who gathers as much information as possible before
visiting car dealers”
TriesFindInvoice: “I am the kind of person who tries to ﬁnd out the dealer?s invoice price on
a car before going to the dealership to shop”
ReadCarMagazine: “I read car- and/or truck- enthusiast magazines regularly”
VisitDealerForFun: “I tend to visit dealers whenever a new model is introduced”
31Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Autobytel 0.03 0.17 0 1 663125
ABTFranchise 0.24 0.43 0 1 663125
SameDealer 0.01 0.09 0 1 663125
Price 23373.89 8091.31 6014 100190 663125
TradeInOverAllowance 954.64 1731.74 -10000 19956 266313
VehicleProﬁt 1437.29 1297.95 -4894 13902 663125
HadTradedIn 0.4 0.49 0 1 663125
AnyFinancing 0.75 0.43 0 1 663125
Trade 0.4 0.49 0 1 663125
Income 56.64 24.89 10.4 150 663125
Income
2 3827.3 3562.7 108.22 22500 663125
%HouseOwnership 0.73 0.22 0 1 663125
MedianHouseValue 164.88 99.66 7.5 500 663125
%CollegeGrad 0.31 0.18 0 1 663125
%LessHighSchool 0.12 0.11 0 1 663125
%Professional 0.16 0.08 0 1 663125
%Executives 0.17 0.08 0 1 663125
%BlueCollar 0.26 0.15 0 1 663125
%Technicians 0.03 0.02 0 1 663125
CustomerAge 43.9 14.12 16 100 663125
Age> 64 0.09 0.29 0 1 663125
Female 0.36 0.48 0 1 663125
Female*Over64 0.03 0.17 0 1 663125
%Hispanic 0.08 0.1 0 0.55 663125
%Black 0.06 0.14 0 1 663125
%Black*MedianHouseVal. 22.77 60.58 0 492.5 663125
%Asian 0.05 0.08 0 1 663125
EndOfMonth 0.22 0.42 0 1 663125
Weekend 0.23 0.42 0 1 663125
VehicleCost 0 0.06 -0.64 0.73 663125
Model Age 5-13 Months 0.73 0.44 0 1 663125
Model Age > 14 Months 0.11 0.32 0 1 663125
#ofCarsSold 2704.96 2265.37 300 12063 663125
#ofCarsSold*Competition 8417.87 11190.21 0 120960 663125
# of ABTFranchises w/in 5 m. 6.12 6.95 0 71 663125
PriceVariation1 0.04 0.01 0 0.24 663125
PriceVariation2 0.04 0.01 0 0.24 663125
PriceVariation2*%College 0.01 0.01 0 0.14 663125
ABTAdvertising 2.37 2.37 0 7.5 663125
ABTAdvertising*Male 1.51 2.21 0 7.5 663125
ABTFranchiseExtraDistance 12.1 23.87 0 2483.46 663125
DealerDistance 5.14 7.71 0 1064.76 663125Table 2: Summary statistics by Autobytel
Autobytel=0 Autobytel=1
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs
ABTFranchise 0.23 0.42 0 1 642753 0.39 0.49 0 1 20372
SameDealer 0 0 0 0 642753 0.28 0.45 0 1 20372
Price 23340 8113 6014 100190 642753 24440 7306 6995 89900 20372
TradeInOverAll. 965 1739 -10000 19956 260317 483.8 1324 -6250 17590 5996
VehicleProﬁt 1439 1300 -4894 13902 642753 1377 1232 -2559 11801 20372
Trade 0.41 0.49 0 1 642753 0.29 0.46 0 1 20372
AnyFinancing 0.75 0.43 0 1 642753 0.63 0.48 0 1 20372
HadTradedIn 0.41 0.49 0 1 642753 0.29 0.46 0 1 20372
Income 56.35 24.8 10.4 150 642753 65.63 25.87 10.68 150 20372
Income
2 3791 3541 108.22 22500 642753 4977 4018 113.96 22500 20372
%HouseOwners. 0.73 0.22 0 1 642753 0.74 0.23 0 1 20372
MedianHouseVal. 163.7 99.1 7.5 500 642753 201.1 110.1 7.5 500 20372
%CollegeGrad 0.31 0.18 0 1 642753 0.38 0.18 0 1 20372
%LessHighSchool 0.13 0.11 0 1 642753 0.09 0.08 0 0.75 20372
%Professional 0.16 0.08 0 1 642753 0.19 0.09 0 1 20372
%Executives 0.17 0.08 0 1 642753 0.2 0.08 0 1 20372
%BlueCollar 0.26 0.15 0 1 642753 0.21 0.13 0 1 20372
%Technicians 0.03 0.02 0 1 642753 0.03 0.02 0 0.28 20372
CustomerAge 43.98 14.17 16 100 642753 41.32 11.99 16 96 20372
Age> 64 0.09 0.29 0 1 642753 0.04 0.2 0 1 20372
Female 0.36 0.48 0 1 642753 0.33 0.47 0 1 20372
Female*Over64 0.03 0.17 0 1 642753 0.01 0.11 0 1 20372
%Hispanic 0.08 0.1 0 0.55 642753 0.07 0.08 0 0.54 20372
%Black 0.06 0.15 0 1 642753 0.04 0.1 0 1 20372
%Black*HouseVal. 23.03 61.12 0 492.5 642753 14.59 38.9 0 480.27 20372
%Asian 0.05 0.08 0 1 642753 0.06 0.09 0 0.97 20372
EndOfMonth 0.22 0.42 0 1 642753 0.24 0.43 0 1 20372
Weekend 0.23 0.42 0 1 642753 0.22 0.41 0 1 20372
VehicleCost 0 0.06 -0.64 0.73 642753 0 0.05 -0.48 0.34 20372
Model Age 5-13 Months 0.73 0.44 0 1 642753 0.72 0.45 0 1 20372
Model Age > 14 Months 0.11 0.32 0 1 642753 0.07 0.26 0 1 20372
#ofCarsSold 2700 2267 300 12063 642753 2877 2217 300 12063 20372
#ofCarsSold*Comp. 8418 11217 0 120960 642753 8411 10303 0 120630 20372
#ofABTFran.in5 m. 6.09 6.93 0 71 642753 7.06 7.51 0 66 20372
PriceVariation1 0.04 0.01 0 0.24 642753 0.04 0.01 0 0.17 20372
PriceVariation2 0.04 0.01 0 0.24 642753 0.04 0.01 0 0.17 20372
PriceVar.2*%Coll. 0.01 0.01 0 0.14 642753 0.02 0.01 0 0.07 20372
ABTAdvertising 2.36 2.37 0 7.5 642753 2.66 2.41 0 7.5 20372
ABTAdv.*Male 1.51 2.21 0 7.5 642753 1.78 2.34 0 7.5 20372
ABTFran.ExtraDist. 12.19 23.95 0 2483 642753 9.32 20.96 0 1412 20372
DealerDistance 5.14 7.73 0 1065 642753 5.4 7.22 0 220.7 20372
Table 3: Summary statistics by AutobytelFranchise
AutobytelFranchise=0 AutobytelFranchise=1
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs
Volume 292.5 458.25 1 4835 3019 562.87 690.23 2 4496 500
Sales 6.89MM 10.97MM 9000 127.6MM 3019 13.27MM 16.16MM 36368 148.78MM 500
%Autobytel 0.04 0.05 0 1 3019 0.08 0.05 0 0.33 500
%Financing 0.67 0.18 0.05 1 2943 0.67 0.15 0.18 0.97 499
%TradeIn 0.44 0.19 0.01 1 2813 0.36 0.14 0.04 0.72 499
%Same 0 0 0 0.1 3019 0.03 0.04 0 0.2 500
%Black 6.06 7.78 0 79.93 3019 6.09 5.49 0 33.32 500
Cust.Age 45.73 8.21 19 83 3019 44.6 6.28 33 69.5 500
Cust.Income 52920 15461 16573 150000 3019 57820 12061 29877 97232 500
Competition 2.43 2.16 0 23 3019 2.64 2.24 1 18 500
* The low minimum for Volume and Sales is due to the fact that some dealerships only started reporting to MRI towards
the end out our sample period.
33Table 4: OLS results†
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable: Full Full EndOfMo.
ln(price) Sample Sample = 1
Autobytel -0.99** -0.89** -0.78**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.058)
AutobytelFranchise -0.5** -0.45** -0.46**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.032)




Weekend 0.099** 0.11** 0.072*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.034)
VehicleCost 88** 88** 88**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.28)
Model Age 5-13 Months 0.17** 0.17** 0.053
(0.031) (0.031) (0.064)







































Constant 1002** 1002** 1003**
(0.043) (0.09) (0.19)
Observations 663125 663125 148384
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.976
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100. * signiﬁcant at 5%; **
sign. at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
34Table 5: Subsegment results†
Autobytel∗... Autobytel∗...
Basic Large -0.45 Lower Midsize -1.4**
(0.39) (0.14)
Compact Pickup -1.8** Luxury SUV -0.46*
(0.18) (0.19)
Compact SUV -0.67** Mid Sporty -1.0**
(0.07) (0.14)
Compact Van -0.55** Mini SUV -1.3**
(0.086) (0.1)
Entry Compact -1.8* Near Luxury -0.33**
(0.8) (0.077)
Entry Sporty -3.1** Premium Compact -1.5**
(1.0) (0.097)
Fullsize Pickup -1.4** Premium Sporty 0.21
(0.33) (0.27)
Fullsize SUV -0.85** Traditional Luxury -0.76
(0.15) (0.49)
International Luxury -0.62** Upper Midsize -1.1**
(0.12) (0.061)
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
† Speciﬁcation as in column 2 in Table 4, excluding Autobytel,
including Autobytel∗subsegment interactions.
35Table 6: Competition results†
(1) (2)







# Competing Dealers -0.029** -0.027**
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Autobytel* -0.051**







Model Age 5-13 Months 0.17** 0.17**
(0.031) (0.031)







Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
† Unreported are CustomerAge, Age>64, %Black,
%Black*MedianHouseVal, %Hispanic, %Asian, Fe-
male, MedianHHIncome, (MedianHHInc.)
2, %College-
Grad, %<HighSchool, %HouseOwn., MedianHouseVal.,
%Professional, %Executives, %BlueCollar, %Techni-
cians, car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects
36Table 7: Probit for IV†





























































Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.10
+ signiﬁcant at 10% * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** sign. at 1%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are HadTradedIn, EndOfMonth, Weekend, Vehicle-
Cost, model age, month, region dummies, and dummies for
missing values in ABTAdvertising and ABTAdvertising*Male. 37Table 8: IV results†
Dep. Var. ln(Price) All without without without without without
Instruments #ABTFran- PriceVar1 PriceVar2, #ofCarsSold, ABTAdvert.,
In5Miles PriceVar2* #ofCarsSold* ABTAdvert.*
College Competition Male
Autobytel -2.41** -2.69** -2.44** -2.29* -2.14* -2.97**
(0.897) (0.894) (0.897) (0.902) (0.928) (0.915)
AutobytelFranchise -1.01** -1.07** -1.01** -1.01** -1.03** -1**
(0.0555) (0.0556) (0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0559) (0.0556)
HadTradedIn 0.295** 0.292** 0.295** 0.296** 0.297** 0.29**
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0154)
EndOfMonth -0.329** -0.328** -0.329** -0.329** -0.329** -0.328**
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0153)
Weekend 0.109** 0.108** 0.108** 0.109** 0.109** 0.107**
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
VehicleCost 88.2** 88.2** 88.2** 88.2** 88.2** 88.2**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Model Age 0.165** 0.164** 0.165** 0.165** 0.165** 0.163**
5-13 Months (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0315)
Model Age > -0.347** -0.348** -0.347** -0.346** -0.346** -0.349**
14 Months (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516)
Income -0.0133** -0.0131** -0.0133** -0.0133** -0.0132** -0.0133**
(0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00142)
Income
2 0.000102** 0.0001** 0.000102** 0.000102** 0.000102** 0.000101**
(8.20e-06) (8.20e-06) (8.20e-06) (8.20e-06) (8.20e-06) (8.21e-06)
%CollegeGrad -0.214* -0.204* -0.213* -0.217* -0.221* -0.198*
(0.0983) (0.0983) (0.0983) (0.0983) (0.0985) (0.0985)
%LessHighSchool 0.451** 0.457** 0.451** 0.45** 0.451** 0.453**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
%HouseOwnership -0.291** -0.292** -0.291** -0.29** -0.291** -0.291**
(0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0438)
MedianHouseValue -0.00224** -0.00221** -0.00224** -0.00224** -0.00224** -0.00222**
(0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000138)
%Professional 0.297* 0.289* 0.297* 0.295* 0.289* 0.305*
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
%Executives 0.0514 0.0603 0.0519 0.0486 0.046 0.0636
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
%BlueCollar -0.0254 -0.0255 -0.0252 -0.0264 -0.0286 -0.0204
(0.0983) (0.0984) (0.0983) (0.0983) (0.0983) (0.0984)
%Technicians 0.64+ 0.662+ 0.641+ 0.633+ 0.625+ 0.671+
(0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345)
CustomerAge 0.00346** 0.00334** 0.00345** 0.0035** 0.00355** 0.00327**
(0.000683) (0.000683) (0.000683) (0.000683) (0.000688) (0.000686)
Age> 64 -0.207** -0.209** -0.207** -0.206** -0.206** -0.21**
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0329)
Female 0.185** 0.184** 0.185** 0.186** 0.187** 0.182**
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0156)
%Asian -0.265** -0.254** -0.265** -0.266** -0.263** -0.264**
(0.0938) (0.0938) (0.0938) (0.0937) (0.0937) (0.0939)
%Black 0.35 0.343 0.35 0.353 0.355 0.339
(0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308)
%Hispanic 1.15** 1.15** 1.15** 1.15** 1.16** 1.14**
(0.0983) (0.0984) (0.0984) (0.0983) (0.0984) (0.0985)
Female*Over64 0.121** 0.123** 0.121** 0.121** 0.121** 0.122**
(0.0465) (0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0466)
Black* 0.00268** 0.0027** 0.00268** 0.00268** 0.00268** 0.0027**
MedianHouseVal. (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.00074)
Constant 1002** 1002** 1002** 1002** 1002** 1002**
(0.0936) (0.0936) (0.0936) (0.0936) (0.0938) (0.0938)
Observations 663125 663125 663125 663125 663125 663125
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** sign. at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
38Table 9: Summary statistics for survey data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Internet 1752 0.73 0.45 0 1
OBSSite 1752 0.37 0.48 0 1
LikeNegotiating 1752 2.18 1.02 1 4
AfraidTakenAdvantage 1752 2.72 0.98 1 4
NoTimeToShop 1752 2.56 0.84 1 4
DoPriceComparisons 1752 3.47 0.66 1 4
GatherMuchInfo 1752 3.16 0.8 1 4
TriesFindInvoice 1752 3.03 0.88 1 4
ReadCarMagazine 1752 1.87 0.84 1 4
VisitDealerForFun 1752 1.69 0.76 1 4
39Table 10: Internet usage by consumer type†





















































* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant
at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
† Response scale on trait variables: 1=”Disagree
Strongly”, 4=”Agree Strongly.”
40Table 11: Dealer cost results†
(1) (2)







Model Age 5-13 Months 16* 0.00047
(8.3) (0.00036)





Adj. R-squared 0.966 0.962
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† Unreported: month, region, and car ﬁxed eﬀects.
41Table 12: Car switching results†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
ln(price) w/ ChangeCar w/ ChangeCar w/ ChangeCar
Autobytel -0.95** -0.9** -0.9** -0.95**
(0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034)




AutobytelFranchise -0.47** -0.47** -0.47** -0.47**





EndOfMonth -0.33** -0.33** -0.33** -0.33**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Weekend 0.11** 0.1** 0.1** 0.1**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Model Age 5-13 Months 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.031) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Model Age > 14 Months -0.34** -0.34** -0.34** -0.34**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
# Competing Dealers -0.029** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
VehicleCost 88** 88** 88** 88**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
HadTradedIn 0.31** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 1002** 1003** 1003** 1003**
(0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Observations 663125 683760 683760 683760
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
† Unreported are CustomerAge, Age>64, %Black, %Black*MedianHouseVal, %Hispanic,
%Asian, Female, MedianHHIncome, (MedianHHInc.)
2, %CollegeGrad, %<HighSchool,
%HouseOwn., MedianHouseVal., %Professional, %Executives, %BlueCollar, %Technicians,
car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
42Figure 1: Dispersion of residuals by Autobytel
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